Dexter Filkins in a blog post in The New Yorker:
For many months, the Obama and Maliki governments talked about keeping a residual force of American troops in Iraq, which would act largely to train Iraq’s Army and to provide intelligence against Sunni insurgents. (It would almost certainly have been barred from fighting.) Those were important reasons to stay, but the most important went largely unstated: it was to continue to act as a restraint on Maliki’s sectarian impulses, at least until the Iraqi political system was strong enough to contain him on its own. The negotiations between Obama and Maliki fell apart, in no small measure because of a lack of engagement by the White House. Today,many Iraqis, including some close to Maliki, say that a small force of American soldiers—working in non-combat roles—would have provided a crucial stabilizing factor that is now Iraq. Sami al-Askari, a Maliki confidant, told me for my article this spring, “If you had a few hundred here, not even a few thousand, they would be coöperating with you, and theywould become your partners.” President Obama wanted the Americans to come home, and Maliki didn’t particularly want them to stay.
My comment in response to the post:
Dexter, years ago, I read your brilliant articles in the New York Times when you covered the Battle of Fallujah, and I sent you emails commending you for your courage and honesty in reporting on the battle. You answered my emails and we corresponded for a while. I know you know Iraq far better than I do and that you came to care for the welfare of the Iraqi people while you reported from their war-torn country.
Still, I am shocked and surprised that you blame Obama's "disengagement" from Iraq for part of the killing and chaos we see today. The president inherited a papered-over chaotic mess. The Bush/Cheney administration wrecked the country, and there was no way Obama could have fixed the situation. You'd have to make the case for me that a few hundred or even a few thousand US military left in the country would have made a difference.
You say:
Sami al-Askari, a Maliki confidant, told me for my article this spring, “If you had a few hundred here, not even a few thousand, they would be coöperating with you, and they would become your partners.”
Why would you take these words at face-value? Maliki wanted us out, and we wanted out, so a very strong case would have had to be made to both sides to keep our military there. Now it's all gone bad, and Maliki wants us back. As others have already said, Iraq is three countries which were grouped into one geographical mass by foreign powers, and the movement now is strongly toward break-up. I fail to understand how a small group of American military could make a difference, and I fail to see how the Obama administration is to blame.
When we send arms to Syria, we are not sure whom we are arming, nor are we certain where the arms will end up. The same will be true in Iraq, and we end up arming opposing forces in both countries.
I wondered where the war-mongering neo-cons, who are now nipping at Obama's heels, got their talking points, and I thought it was pure made-up let's-get Obama-at-any-cost talk because an election approaches, but, to my great disappointment, I see one answer in this blog post, alas.
